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Reimagining international society through  
the emergence of Japanese imperialism 
SHOGO SUZUKI1
INTRODUCTION: WHAT DID JAPAN MAKE OF INTERNATIONAL 
SOCIETY? 
In the not too distant past Timothy Dunne asserted that ‘[International] 
society is what states have made of it’.2 Since then much has been written 
about how the English School offers a valuable interpretivist approach, 
how it has spread across the world, how it can be improved, and what it 
has to say about non-European societies and ‘world society’.3 This paper 
aims to contribute to all three facets of the debate through a case study of 
how the Japanese elite understood international society during the 
bakumatsu (late-Tokugawa)/early-Meiji periods (1853–95). In doing so, it 
1  Doctoral Candidate, Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian 
Studies, The Australian National University. Versions of this paper were presented at the Institute of 
Oriental Culture at the University of Tokyo in January 2003, and at the International Studies 
Association conference in Portland, Oregon, in February 2003. I thank all the participants, 
particularly Tanaka Akihiko and Yamamoto Kazuya for their comments. I am also grateful to 
Yongjin Zhang for giving me the opportunity to write this paper in the first place. I should also like 
to thank Malcolm Cook, Miwa Hirono, and Joel Quirk for saving me from many embarrassing 
errors in the course of writing, and Tomoko Akami and Kathy Morton for their detailed comments in 
rewriting the paper. An especially big thank you is due to Len Seabrooke for encouraging me and 
helping me to submit this paper for the series. Japanese personal names throughout this paper are 
presented in Japanese form, with family name followed by given name. Exceptions are made in the 
case of Japanese authors writing in English who choose to write their name in accordance with the 
English convention. Macrons (for words such as rōjū) indicate long vowels. Macrons have not been 
used for well-known names such as Tokyo. Chinese names and words follow the pinyin 
romanisation system. 
2  Timothy Dunne, ‘The social construction of international society’, European Journal of 
International Relations 1(3) 1995, pp. 367–89, at p. 376. 
3  See Chris Brown, ‘World society and the English School: An “international society” perspective on 
world society’, European Journal of International Relations 7(4) 2001, pp. 423–41; John M. 
Hobson and Leonard Seabrooke, ‘Reimagining Weber: Constructing international society and the 
social balance of power’, European Journal of International Relations 7(2) 2001, pp. 239–74; and 
Yongjin Zhang, ‘The “English School” in China: A travelogue of ideas and their diffusion’, 
European Journal of International Relations 9(1) 2003, pp. 87–114. 
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examines the emergence of Japanese imperialism from the perspective of 
international society as perceived by English School scholars. 
Within the English School approach, an international society is deemed 
to exist when ‘a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and 
common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves 
to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, 
and share in the working of common institutions’.4 Although there is 
dispute within the English School over the degree to which norms and 
procedures should govern international society (the pluralist/solidarist 
debate), it is generally argued that the commonality of interest amongst a 
society of states introduces stability to an anarchical international realm by 
reducing uncertainty and rampant power politics. For English School 
scholars, this theory of conflict mitigation through the ‘universal’ 
socialisation of states is a reflection of Northwestern European experiences 
over the past few centuries.  
But this experience does not hold true in the case of Japan’s exposure to 
international society from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. The 
Japanese experienced their first full encounter with European international 
society in 1853,5 when the United States forced Japan to open its ports to 
the West. From that date we see Japan embark on an aggressive quest of 
imperialism. It sent troops to Taiwan in 1874, and went to war with China in 
1894–95, followed by war with Russia in 1904–05. Taiwan was annexed in 
1895, and so was Korea in 1910. Judging from the dates Japan embarked on 
its expansionary policies, there is a strong correlation between the rise of 
Japanese imperialism and Japan’s entry into international society. The 
Japanese imperialist response to international society directly contradicts 
English School scholars’ conception of a ‘universal’ socialisation of states 
that mitigate conflict through the sharing of common interests.  
4  See Hedley Bull, The anarchical society (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1995), p. 13. 
5  ‘European international society’ is used here in lieu of ‘international society’. ‘International society’ 
at the time of the nineteenth century was still very much Eurocentric, and the use of the term 
‘international society’ seems hardly appropriate here. Also note that the term ‘European society of 
states’ will also be used for stylistic purposes. Finally, ‘European international society’ also includes 
the United States. 
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This is not to suggest that an imperialist perspective has greater 
explanatory value. In the case of Meiji Japan, while economic interests 
clearly played a part in the rise of imperialism, they did not assume a 
dominant role. Indeed, ‘the Japanese government … had difficulty in luring 
domestic capital into colonial investment at the outset of the nation’s 
imperial venture’. Moreover, ‘private economic interests … emerged after 
the initial steps were taken on the road to colonial conquest, not before, and 
their main thrust was directed less toward the formal colonial territories’.6 
Rather, Japanese imperialism in the nineteenth century was deeply 
intertwined with Japan’s quest to achieve great power status within the 
European-dominated international order and hence its socialisation into 
European international society.  
Despite the reservation noted above, this essay argues that the English 
School approach still offers a useful lens for examining the ideational aspect 
of the emergence of Japanese imperialism, because it provides a framework 
for understanding the socialisation of states. Indeed, Andrew Hurrell has 
pointed out that the English School has had an interest in examining 
‘membership norms and relations between insiders and outsiders, and with 
issues of legitimacy and [with] how social order is seen from the margins as 
well as the centre’.7 
At this point, a number of clarifications are in order. My use of the 
English School approach indicates my belief that the theoretical concept of 
‘international society’ offers a powerful tool for understanding state 
behaviour. By international society, it is meant that  
… a group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political 
communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the 
behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculation of others, but 
also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and 
6  Mark R. Peattie, ‘Introduction’, in Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, eds, The Japanese 
colonial empire, 1895–1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 3–52, at p. 12. 
7  Andrew Hurrell, ‘Keeping history, law and political philosophy firmly within the English School’, 
Review of International Studies 27(3) 2001, pp. 489–94, at p. 490. 
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institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their 
common interest in maintaining these arrangements.8
Within the context of the socialisation of non-European states’ into 
European international society, Hedley Bull and Adam Watson cite 
evidence such as the adoption of international law and participation in the 
European diplomatic system as evidence of these states’ entry and 
socialisation into European international society. While this evidence by 
itself may be somewhat weak, the fact that we see Japan’s adoption of the 
sovereign state system (another institution which traces its origins to 
Europe) provides further evidence of the (reluctant) acceptance of the 
institutions of the European society of states. Hence, it is assumed that 
Japan did enter and was socialised into European international society, even 
though its ruling elite may not have perceived this society as an ontological 
being.9  
It should also be made clear here that this study focuses primarily on the 
political elites of Japan, and does not deal with actors of civil society. For a 
start, it is extremely difficult to empirically prove the degree to which non-
elite actors could have influenced the Meiji leadership. Furthermore, this 
omission can be justified from an empirical point of view. While it is 
obvious that non-elite actors do matter and did wield some influence, the 
Meiji Restoration was primarily an elite affair, and the political leadership 
retained a strong grip on subsequent political decision-making.  
The paper proceeds as follows. First, it offers a critique of previous 
studies which have analysed Japan’s entry into (European) international 
society. Second, it explores the expansion of international society from a 
European perspective followed by an explanation of Japanese inter-
pretations of European international society in the bakumatsu and early 
Meiji periods. It then investigates how these interpretations affected the 
Japanese elites perceptions of the institutions of European international 
8  Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, ‘Introduction’, in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds, The 
expansion of international society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 1–9, at p. 1. 
9  The notion of an ‘international society’ or kokusai shakai (which should not be confused with the 
theoretical conceptualisation of the English School which is used here) only appeared in Japan after 
the Versailles Treaty of 1919, amid considerable scepticism. For this point, I am indebted to Tomoko 
Akami. 
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society and how this related to the emergence of imperialism in Japan. The 
paper concludes by suggesting two avenues through which the English 
School approach can be further strengthened: first, there needs to be a 
greater incorporation of non-European states’ perspectives in order to gain a 
better understanding of their socialisation into the European society of 
states. Second, the findings here suggest the existence of a separate 
European international society that governed relations between ‘civilised’ 
Western states and ‘uncivilised’ non-Western states. In order to enrich our 
understanding of the expansion of European international society, there is a 
need to understand that non-Western states’ socialisation into European 
international society was more likely to have taken place under a different 
set of social structures, and this accordingly influenced their interpretations 
of the European society of states. 
SHORTCOMINGS IN CONVENTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS WITHIN 
THE ENGLISH SCHOOL 
The most important work examining Japan’s introduction to international 
society is Hidemi Suganami’s contribution to a collection of essays edited 
by two founders of the English School, Bull and Watson, entitled The 
expansion of international society. In this work, the metamorphosis within 
Japan is examined almost exclusively in terms of the adoption of co-
operative norms—European diplomatic practices and international law—
and Japan’s participation in international conferences.10 This approach 
seems to closely reflect Bull’s assertion that members of international 
society should consider themselves as being bound by a commitment to 
maintaining the ‘structure of coexistence and co-operation’.11
Gerrit W. Gong provides further explanations for this focus on co-
operative institutions of international society in his work on the ‘standard of 
civilisation’. He argues that treaties between European and non-European 
states evolved into a ‘standard’ which could ‘define the legal requirements 
necessary for a non-European country … to gain full and “civilized” status 
10  Hidemi Suganami, ‘Japan’s entry into international society’, in Bull and Watson, eds, The expansion 
of international society, pp. 185–99. 
11  Hedley Bull, ‘The emergence of a universal international society’, in Bull and Watson, eds, The 
expansion of international society, pp. 117–26, at p. 120. 
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in “civilized” international society’.12 The ‘standard of civilisation’ was 
heavily imbued by cooperative norms. It stipulated that in order to be 
considered ‘civilised’ and gain entry into international society, states were 
required to ‘guarantee the life, liberty, and property of foreign nationals; to 
demonstrate a suitable governmental organization; to adhere to the accepted 
diplomatic practices; and to abide by the principles of international law’.13 
In this sense, the point at which non-European states were deemed by the 
Western powers to have satisfied the ‘standard of civilisation’—which in 
effect meant the adoption of the cooperative norms found within European 
international society—was considered the point at which such states gained 
entry into international society. Accordingly, both Gong’s and Suganami’s 
accounts of non-European states’ entry into international society depict 
these states’ modernisation, particularly the adoption of modern diplomacy, 
international law and the political structures of Western states. These efforts 
were to eventually gain the Western states’ recognition of Japan as a 
‘civilised’ state, able to adequately protect foreign property in Japan and 
assert effective governance over its territory. As a result, the Japanese were 
able to bring about the abrogation of the unequal treaties which Japan was 
forced to sign in the nineteenth century, and this marked Japan’s entry as a 
full member into international society.  
Although the studies above have added much to our understanding of 
how Japan gained membership of international society, their descriptions 
are somewhat narrow due to their concentration on the adoption of the 
cooperative institutions of international society. What is lacking here is a 
more in-depth examination of how the fundamental normative goals of 
international society—understood by Bull as the ‘preservation of the system 
and society of states’, ‘maintaining the independence or external sove-
reignty of individual states’, ‘peace’, and ‘limitation of violence resulting in 
death or bodily harm’—were transmitted to Japan.14 Chris Brown has noted 
that ‘[English School] theory characteristically uses the same terminology 
of rules and norms to describe both the ways in which states actually 
12  Gerrit W. Gong, ‘China’s entry into international society’, in Bull and Watson, eds, The expansion of 
international society, pp. 171–83, at p. 179. 
13  Ibid. 
14  Bull, The anarchical society, pp. 16–18. 
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behave (a matter for empirical observation) and the way in which they 
ought to behave (the product of a moral discourse) … norms are assumed to 
be both the product of the interaction of states and regulative of those 
interactions’.15 However, Japan’s imperialist behaviour, prominent after its 
first full encounter with European international society, seems to contradict 
this view; a point ignored or missing from previous studies.  
Suganami does mention that Japan’s interaction with its neighbours 
(China and Korea)  
in form, was based on treaty obligations; in substance, it was an exercise 
in power politics … Japan’s foreign relations [with neighbouring Asian 
states] is one in which she began to apply what she had learnt from the 
West in her external affairs … [By 1911, when Japan recovered its tariff 
autonomy], Japan had begun to behave like a Great Power.16  
But Suganami offers little explanation on what exactly Japan ‘learnt from 
the West’, which resulted in increased conflict with China and Korea. Nor 
does he explain adequately what the role of a ‘Great Power’, which the 
Japanese sought to emulate, was in nineteenth century international 
society.  
Gong’s work, The standard of ‘civilization’ in international society, is 
more sensitive to the discrepancies between the goals of international 
society and Japan’s behaviour after its incorporation into international 
society. He argues that the Western powers’ reluctance to accept Japan as an 
equal partner in international society ultimately led the Japanese to rebel 
against this international order. In particular, Gong mentions the Western 
powers’ reluctance to abrogate the unequal treaties with Japan and the 
‘Triple Intervention’ of 1895, where Russia, France and Germany coerced 
Japan to return the Liaodong peninsula (which the latter had acquired 
following the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–95) to China, only to then 
demand territorial concessions from the Chinese themselves. The latter 
episode aroused particular bitterness among the Japanese, who, ‘[a]fter 
conforming wholeheartedly to the spirit and letter of international law and 
15  Brown, ‘World society and the English School’, p. 438. 
16  Suganami, ‘Japan’s entry into international society’, p. 192. 
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diplomacy … conclude[d] that, in the end, only force mattered in 
international relations’.17 Gong concludes: ‘If anything, Japan took the 
standard [of civilisation] too seriously and naively, on face value, not 
understanding that even “civilized” international society was characterised 
by anarchy (the absence of a monopoly of legitimate violence) and 
hierarchy (because without civil society, rights depend largely on might)’.18 
Three criticisms should be offered here: 1) the social origins of Japanese 
perceptions of international society can be traced to the mid-nineteenth 
century, not the end of the nineteenth century; 2) the English School 
exaggerates the relevance of the European historical experience in their 
account of the expansion of international society to East Asia; and 3) 
English School interpretations of non-European states effectively rob them 
of agency as they are introduced to international society.  
First, I am not convinced that the events that Gong offers—particularly 
the Triple Intervention of 1895—mark the turning point in which the 
Japanese decided that power was all that mattered in international society. 
In fact, I believe the roots of such perceptions are deeper, dating back to the 
time when Japan was forced at gunpoint to open its doors to international 
society. Furthermore, the Japanese were less naive in their perception of the 
‘standard of civilisation’ than Gong thinks. An examination of primary 
sources by the Japanese political elite in the mid-nineteenth century (I 
provide more detail on these sources in the text below) suggests that 
perceptions of international society as a realm in which power politics 
reigned supreme were already formed, and that a more in-depth analysis of 
Japan’s engagement with international society is necessary. 
Second, such shortcomings in accounting for Japan’s reaction to their 
incorporation into international society highlights the English School’s 
tendency to account for the socialisation of non-European states into 
international society by extrapolating from the European experience. As 
European international society has expanded to the degree that it is often 
portrayed as a ‘universal’ international society, most conventional 
17  Gerrit W. Gong, The standard of ‘civilization’ in international society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1984), p. 196. 
18  Ibid., p. 165. 
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scholarship has concentrated on how this European order came to be 
accepted throughout the world. Non-European states’ adoption of the 
diplomatic system and international law are seen as evidence of this. As 
Martin Wight states:  
International society … is manifest in the diplomatic system; in the 
conscious maintenance of the balance of power to preserve the 
independence of the member-communities; in the regular operations of 
international law, whose binding force is accepted over a wide though 
politically unimportant range of subjects; in economic, social and 
technical interdependence and the functional international institutions 
established latterly to regulate it. All these presuppose an international 
social consciousness, a world-wide community-sentiment.19
The result, however, is a general tendency to assume that the normative 
structure of European international society, with its goals of ‘provid[ing] 
for peaceful coexistence in an anarchical and plural world by encouraging 
toleration’ (such as sovereign equality and territorial integrity) was 
naturally transmitted to non-European states and their respective 
international systems.20  
In many cases, however, the expansion of international society came 
hand in hand not with conflict mitigation and enhanced order, but with 
imperialism. Imperialist expansion did not always have scope for the norms 
of toleration and coexistence. Conventional studies by English School 
scholars tacitly acknowledge the role of imperialism in the expansion of 
international society, but still assume that the European model of 
international society spread to non-European states and eventually gained 
acceptance. The result has been a lack of studies that explore the norms and 
purposes of a different form of international society which governed the 
relations between European states and non-European states (particularly 
those which were subject to colonialism by the European powers).  
19  Martin Wight, ‘Western values in international relations’, in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, 
eds, Diplomatic investigations: Essays in the theory of international politics (London: George Allen 
& Unwin, 1966), pp. 89–131, at pp. 96–7. 
20  Edward Keene, Beyond the anarchical society: Grotius, colonialism and order in world politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 147. 
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A related weakness with the English School approach is the tendency to 
overemphasise cooperative norms and underemphasise other institutions of 
international society such as war, the role of the great powers, and the 
balance of power—which appear to have more elements of power politics 
than international order.21 This perhaps is a result of the English School’s 
agenda of demonstrating that a degree of order and morality can be 
maintained under anarchical structures.22 Moreover, these cooperative 
norms are argued to stem from European civilisation. Wight argued that the 
‘rationalist’ tradition originated from medieval and modern European 
history, and that ‘[t]he cultivation of this middle ground, and the discovery 
of political morality, seem peculiarly related to Western values’.23
The view that the expansion of international society brought an element 
of order and peace into foreign relations within East Asia (and perhaps 
amongst other non-European areas) is deeply naive. Many non-European 
states’ entry into international society took place as a result of ‘gunboat 
diplomacy’ by the Western powers, and after some military clashes had 
taken place between them. Moreover the Japanese embarked on a road of 
imperialism which was only stopped in 1945. This returns us to my key 
question in exploring Japan’s introduction to international society: if 
international society is supposed to have the effect of mitigating global 
disorder, why did disorder—namely increased war or imperialism—take 
place after non-Asian states’ encounter with international society? Could it 
be that the other previously unmentioned institutions played a crucial role in 
producing exactly the opposite effect? In the case of Japan, neither 
Suganami nor Gong’s studies offer us many clues. Of course, it may be 
somewhat unfair to criticise Gong’s case study on this basis, as he is 
concerned with Japan’s conformation to the ‘standard of civilisation’, which 
called for the adoption of norms and political systems which would lead to 
more genial relations with the Western powers. However, apart from his 
acknowledgement of hypocrisy and highly differential treatment of non-
Asian states by the Western powers, Gong appears to attribute any highly 
21  Also see Hobson and Seabrooke, ‘Reimagining Weber’. 
22  Timothy Dunne, Inventing international society: A history of the English School (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Press, 1998), p. 54. 
23  Wight, ‘Western values in international relations’, p. 128. 
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insecure interpretations of international society held by the Japanese to stem 
from ‘perceptions rooted in Japanese culture’.24 The different sets of norms 
which may have governed non-European states relations with European 
international society, and its impact upon the Japanese psyche, remain 
underexplored. 
Third, another weakness with the English School approach is the lack of 
agency ascribed to non-European states. Traditionally, English School 
scholars (and scholars from other perspectives) have asserted that the 
adoption of the institutions of international society indicate a commitment 
to the norms governing international society. For instance, it is argued that 
once states are incorporated into international society, they reproduce the 
institutions of that particular society (as can be seen by Japan’s adoption of 
the modern diplomatic system). This indicates, it is then claimed, an 
acceptance of the constitutive norms of that particular society, rather than a 
shallow, practical agreement of basic rules which enables multiple states 
with different identities to coexist. For example, Christian Reus-Smit argues 
that the  
foundation of international society is mutual recognition, the use of 
standards of legitimate statehood to determine which polities will be 
granted the entitlements of sovereign statehood. A deep politics of iden-
tity thus undergirds international society, determining its membership.25  
The problem here is that this view assumes an almost homogeneous 
interpretation of the institutions and norms of international society, and has 
little room for potential variations in the acceptances and responses to these 
norms. It is certainly true that the reproduction of the institutions of 
international society has taken place. However, there exists a distinct 
possibility that the motives behind establishing these institutions may have 
been quite different. The norms and rules which governed the institutions of 
international society had their origins in Europe. International law gained 
recognition by the nineteenth century, while the concept of maintaining a 
24  Gong, The standard of ‘civilization’ in international society, p. 172. 
25  Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Imagining society: Constructivism and the English School’, British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations 4(3) 2002, pp. 487–509, at p. 503. See also Kai Alderson and 
Andrew Hurrell, ‘Bull’s conception of international society’, in Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell, 
eds, Hedley Bull on international society (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2000), pp. 1–19, at p. 14. 
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balance of power and the diplomatic system (as a conscious policy) came 
into being through the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 and the Congress of Vienna 
in 1815, respectively. European states’ frequent interactions with one 
another, and their subsequent ‘development of a degree of recognition and 
accommodation among them’ resulted in the emergence of international 
society.26 A degree of cultural affinity and familiarity may also have helped 
facilitate this sense of commitment to shared norms.27 
In contrast, many of the non-European states did not participate in the 
founding of international society. A lack of geographical proximity meant 
that both sides had insufficient contact with one another, and neither did 
they share a common culture or god. Bull himself agrees that prior to 
European expansion which resulted in the expansion of international 
society, 
neither the Europeans nor the non-Europeans in their dealing with one 
another can be said to have been moved by common interests they 
perceived in maintaining an enduring structure of coexistence and co-
operation among independent political communities over the world as a 
whole. They were not able to invoke a common and agreed set of rules to 
this end, such as came later to be assumed as the basis of international 
intercourse over the world as a whole.28
It is therefore highly likely that a simplistic adoption of the norms of 
European international society did not occur but, because of the thinness 
of their historical and empirical details, English School scholars have 
failed to address this possibility.  
So what were the reactions of non-European states? What follows below 
is an attempt to forward a critique of the aforementioned weaknesses in the 
English School approach through a case study of Japan’s incorporation into 
international society, with the hope of pointing to further avenues of 
developing and refining the theoretical approach of the English School. The 
case study first explores Japan’s encounter with international society in both 
26  Barry Buzan, ‘From international system to international society: Structural realism and regime 
theory meet the English School’, International Organization 47(3) 1993, pp. 327–52, at p. 334. 
27  Ibid. Also see Wight, ‘Western values in international relations’, p. 98. 
28  Bull, ‘The emergence of a universal international society’, p. 118. 
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the bakumatsu period and the early Meiji period. Second, it then attempts to 
analyse the likely interpretations of international society by the Japanese 
elite, and examine how this led to the rise of Japanese imperialism. 
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY EXPANDS TO JAPAN: WESTERN 
PERCEPTIONS 
Japan’s—and indeed East Asia’s—first formal encounter with inter-
national society took place in the nineteenth century. This was a time 
when Europe was experiencing spectacular economic and technological 
growth, and it is perhaps not surprising that the expansion of international 
society came hand in hand with the expansion of European economic 
interests. Eager to secure profits from overseas markets, European 
(particularly British) and American merchants began to turn their attention 
to East Asia. However, China, Japan and Korea had all officially closed 
off their borders to merchants. Private trade was forbidden, and only 
highly controlled government-approved trade was allowed.29 To many 
Western merchants, such restrictive trading agreements ran contrary to 
their commercial interests of exploiting what they believed to be a 
lucrative East Asian market. They began to lobby their governments to 
redress the situation and allow for free trade in the region.  
The largest and most powerful state in East Asia, the Chinese Empire, 
was their first target. W. G. Beasley states this required that the West 
demand three conditions. First, that China ‘guarantee access to the trade of 
China as widely as possible and with the minimum of constraint.’ Second, 
the Chinese ‘had to afford foreign merchants a measure of protection 
against what were held to be the unjust and arbitrary acts of Chinese 
officials’.30 Third, the protection of foreigners’ property rights had to be 
promptly enforced. However, China was not the only target the European 
states had in mind. The West was already showing a keen interest in the 
29  In China, trade with the West was only allowed to be carried out in the port of Canton (present day 
Guangzhou). This form of trade is known as the Canton system of trade. In the case of Japan, trade 
was confined to Nagasaki (with the exception of trade with Korea). However, this system did not 
always function as efficiently as the political elite hoped—private trade, usually in the form of 
smuggling, continued to flourish. 
30  W. G. Beasley, Japanese imperialism, 1894–1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 15. 
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Chinese Empire’s neighbour, Japan. An article which appeared in The Times 
on 26 March 1852 is illustrative: 
What we do know is, that Japan raises an enormous quantity of wheat, 
rice, barley, &c., which, together with silks, gold, copper, and silver, are 
sent down the coast to China, and that the revenue of the empire is 
estimated at $140,000,000 … we hope and trust that the day is near at 
hand when, under a judicious protective system, we shall be sending 
enormous quantities of cotton goods, iron, &c., to Japan, and receive in 
return her gold, silver, and dye-woods … 
In addition, by the time of the nineteenth century, the ‘standard of 
civilisation’, which stipulated the need for ‘civiliz[ing] the peoples under … 
imperial rule, encouraging economic and technological progress and giving 
them the best possible government’, had emerged adding further impetus 
for expansion.31 A passage in the same article in The Times cited above is 
representative of this phenomenon. Referring to Japan’s continued policy of 
sakoku (鎖国 closing off its borders to foreign contact), the article claims: 
Now, we deny the right of any nation situated upon, and occupying a 
portion of the sea-coast of the world, to refuse all commercial inter-
course with other nations. Such a course may be tolerated by civilized 
nations so long as it does not interfere with their commerce and the 
welfare of the human race; but we insist that it is the right of civilized 
and Christian nations to compel barbarians thus situated to submit to the 
general law of nations, and to a certain degree of intercourse … 
The day that Japan would finally be ‘compelled’ to open its borders to 
the expanding West came in July 1853, when the fleet of Commodore 
Matthew C. Perry of the United States appeared outside Tokyo Bay. Perry 
demanded the opening up of Japanese ports to provide shelter and 
assistance for any American ships in distress. The Treaty of Peace and 
Amity (日米和親条約 nichibei washin jōyaku) was signed between the US 
and Japan in March 1854, and within two years an American consul, 
Townsend Harris, had arrived on the shores of Japan. This incident was 
Japan’s first introduction to a key institution of international society—the 
diplomatic system—and can be said to mark Japan’s first encounter with 
31  Keene, Beyond the anarchical society, p. 83. Also see Gong, The standard of ‘civilization’ in 
international society, p. 48. 
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international society. As is with the assumed role of international society, it 
appears that the West was hoping that this would facilitate peaceful relations 
with the Japanese. A commentary in the New York Times on 24 February 
1852 stated that in  
… dealing with a barbarous people, some attempts should be made … to 
obtain their confidence and good will, before resorting to force … they 
should be made to feel that as a nation we [the US] are magnanimous. To 
make them feel this, we should so act … We detest the spirit which urges 
a powerful nation to adopt compulsory measures with a weaker.  
In spite of these ‘peaceful’ intentions the West may have professed and 
harboured in extending the institutions and governing norms of inter-
national society, the Japanese interpreted international society very 
differently indeed. 
JAPAN AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY IN THE BAKUMATSU AND 
MEIJI PHASES 
Although Japan’s first formal encounter with international society took 
place when Perry’s fleet arrived on the shores near Edo (present day 
Tokyo), their view of how European states behave dates back to the earlier 
half of the nineteenth century. The Japanese had a taste of the realpolitik 
that dominated European international politics in 1808, when the British 
(who were at war with the French-occupied Netherlands) warship 
Phaeton entered Japanese waters in Nagasaki with the aim of seizing 
Dutch ships. The British eventually seized two Dutch trading personnel 
located in Nagasaki and demanded the supply of food and water in 
exchange for the hostages. At the same time, British and Russian ships 
increasingly encroached upon Japanese shores, requesting trading relations.  
It was under these circumstances that Aizawa Seishisai wrote Shinron, 
which discusses the European international society which was drawing 
closer to Japan.32 Aizawa himself had the chance to come into direct contact 
with Europeans, having interviewed British sailors who landed on the 
32  Aizawa Seishisai (1782–1863) was a samurai-scholar of the Mito fiefdom. He eventually became 
the head of the Kōdōkan, the Mito fiefdom’s school in 1840. His influential work, Shinron, was 
originally intended for the Mito lord but was later disseminated widely and influenced many samurai 
opposed to the signing of the unequal treaties with the West. 
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shores of the Mito fiefdom in 1824. Aizawa’s account of the international 
order outside the vicinity of East Asia is a highly dangerous one. He 
compares it to that of the realpolitik-dominated ‘so-called seven states of the 
end of the Zhou dynasty’ in which each state vied with each other for 
hegemony (夫れ方今、宇内を挙げ列して七雄となして、周末の所謂七雄な 
るものと、小大異なれりといへども、その勢もまた絶だ相似た
るものあり).33 The European states, or ‘Western barbarians’, intent on 
invading China, would first form alliances with other states and pro-
gressively weaken other non-European empires such as the Ottoman 
Empire and the Mogul Empire. ‘They would then fight with the Qing over 
the land of the Jungars [i.e. Oirat Mongolia]’, and ‘if victorious would then 
sail over in droves and attack the celestial land [Japan]’.34
If such views were still being held by a minority, the Opium War of 
1840–42 and China’s subsequent defeat was to give the Japanese political 
leadership a strong sense that the Western-dominated international order 
was one which could pose a grave threat to Japan.35 News of the Opium 
War reached the Japanese through Dutch and Chinese reports (Oranda 
fūsetsusho 阿蘭陀風説書 and Kara fūsetsusho 唐風説書). In 1841, 
Tokugawa shogunate official Shibukawa Rokuzō submitted a memorial 
pointing to the possibility of a Chinese defeat and a subsequent invasion of 
33  Aizawa Seishisai, ‘Shinron’, in Imai Usaburō, Seya Yoshihiko and Bitō Masahide, eds, Nihon shisō 
taikei, Volume 53: Mitogaku (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1953), pp. 53–158, at p. 93. The ‘seven states’ 
is a description of the Spring and Autumn and Warring State periods in Chinese history. During this 
time, seven major city-states fought with each other for the unification of China. It is seen as a 
classic period in which realpolitik—such as alliances, wars, and diplomatic intrigues—flourished.  
34  Ibid., p. 92. 
35  This point is also confirmed by Meiji oligarch Ōkuma Shigenobu. Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi also 
notes that the ‘First Opium War … drastically altered long-held Japanese perceptions of Japan’s 
place in international power relations.’ See Ōkuma Shigenobu and Enjōji Kiyoshi, Ōkuma haku 
sekijitsu tan, Volume 1 (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1980), pp. 207–8; and Bob Tadashi 
Wakabayashi, ‘Opium, expulsion, sovereignty: China’s lessons for bakumatsu Japan’, Monumenta 
Nipponica 47(1) 1992, pp. 1–25, at p. 2. However, I do not entirely agree with his assertion that 
‘informed Japanese students of the world scene had viewed [international relations] as an arena of 
“rival states” in which China was the greatest power in East Asia, Western countries were middle-
class powers, and Japan was relatively small and weak’. Sino-Japanese relations prior to the 
expansion of international society were not necessarily dominated by power politics. Although Japan 
did, to an extent, challenge Chinese supremacy in the East Asian international order, this took the 
form of calling itself the centre of the hierarchical order which characterised international relations 
in the region, rather than actually balancing Chinese military power. 
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Japan by the British.36 The following year, Dutch intelligence reports had 
reported that Hong Kong had been ceded to the British, and was now under 
the administration of a British governor. The report stated that the Chinese 
cannons were no match for those of the British, and that whereas the British 
‘would have fifteen casualties, the Chinese apparently suffered one 
thousand five hundred casualties’.37 By 1853, it was clear to many informed 
circles that it was only a matter of time before the impact of the expanding 
West would reach the shores of Japan, and the consequences of this could 
be ominous for the Japanese. The governor of the Dutch East Indies, A. J. 
Duymaer van Twist wrote in a letter to his superior in the Netherlands:  
I have no intention of hiding the fact that Japan will be facing grave 
conflicts in the very near future. It is certain that either America or 
Britain, or perhaps even both states are approaching Japan, and if they 
cannot obtain what they want, they may even resort to war.38 
The Dutch warned the Tokugawa regime of American plans to send a 
fleet to Japan, and urged them to commence peaceful trading relations with 
them in accordance with their wishes. The American fleet, the Dutch letter 
warned, ‘comprises of several steam ships and sailing ships, and are 
equipped to an extent that we cannot guarantee that they will not use force if 
their rightful demands are not met’.39 Such information clearly resulted in 
an increased emphasis on the importance of using coercion within inter-
national society even before Perry and his gunboats arrived. The Japanese 
political elite began to perceive this order as a highly coercive, insecure one 
in which Japan’s survival was precarious. 
36  Iwashita Tetsunori, ‘Ahen sensō jōhō no dentatsu to juyō: Tenpō jū nen kara jūsan nen made’, in 
Meiji ishin shi gakkai, eds, Meiji ishin to seiyō kokusai shakai (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1999), 
pp. 3–35, at p. 15. Shibukawa Rokuzō occupied the post of tenmongata, which was responsible for 
analysing foreign intelligence. His memorial cited here was submitted to the rōjū Mizuno Tadakuni. 
The rōjū was the highest post in the shogunate bureaucracy, and responsible for policy formation of 
the Tokugawa shogunate. Therefore, it can be assumed that Shibukawa’s memorial would have had 
some impact on the perceptions of international society of the Japanese political elite. 
37  Cited in ibid., p. 19. 
38  Cited in Miyako Voss, ed. and trans., Bakumatsu dejima mikōkai bunsho: Donkeru-kuruchiusu 
oboegaki (Tokyo: Shinjinbutsu ōrai sha, 1992), pp. 204–5. Also see Iwashita, ‘Ahen sensō jōhō no 
dentatsu to juyō’, p. 18. 
39  Voss, ed. and trans., Bakumatsu dejima mikōkai bunsho, p. 209, emphasis added. 
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When Japan finally experienced its full encounter with international 
society in 1853, its worst fears seemed to be confirmed. Japan’s first 
encounter with international society was indeed one of a coercive nature, as 
they found a fleet of American gunboats at the doorstep of Edo. As far as 
many quarters in the West were concerned, this was quite acceptable. In an 
article titled ‘The United States expedition against Japan’, The Times noted: 
It is a fair question how far any tribe or race of human beings possesses 
the right of excluding the rest of mankind from all participa-tion [sic] in 
the benefits to be derived from an extensive and beautiful region … Is 
this right of exclusion founded on reason or on force? If on reason, we 
should be curious to see the arguments by which it can be maintained. If 
the right of exclusion is simply the right of force, why, let those who 
appeal to such a principle be prepared at all times to make it good. They 
may feel well assured that, some time or other, their pretensions will be 
put to the test. In any case, they can lay little claim to sympathy. They 
have by their own acts put themselves out of the pale of the great 
brotherhood of nations. They have refused all aid to others; how can they 
ask it for themselves?40
Meanwhile, a slightly more sympathetic article ‘Japan and the United 
States’ appeared in the New York Times on 24 February 1852: 
A fleet composed of several steamers, backed by a frigate and one or two 
corvettes, is by no means a peaceful demonstration; and we fear that the 
effect of the arrival of these ships in the waters of Japan will be to 
frighten the poor Japanese out of their seaport towns, and out of their 
wits at the same time, so that it will be impossible to bring them to terms 
in good faith.  
Japanese reactions to Perry’s arrival seem to endorse the above 
correspondent’s fears. Although the event had been anticipated by the 
political elite, the sight of the gunboats indeed seems to have ‘frightened’ 
them ‘out of their wits’. Perry’s gunboats and their knowledge of China’s 
defeat at the hands of the West forced them to conclude that any resistance 
40  Cited in Kokusai nyūsu jiten shuppan iinkai and Mainichi komyunikeishonzu, eds, Kokusai 
nyūsu jiten: Gaikoku shinbun ni miru Nippon, Volume 1: Genbun hen (Tokyo: Mainichi 
komyunikeishonzu, 1989), pp. 16–17. 
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against the United States’ wishes would be futile.41 In a memorial 
submitted to the shogunate shortly after Perry’s arrival, the lord of the 
Fukuoka fiefdom, Kuroda (Matsudaira) Narihiro argued that although 
Japan might be able to prepare itself and mount a challenge to Perry when 
the latter returned, 
… there would be no doubt that Japanese troops will be annihilated from 
soldier to officer. This is what we would call a foolish war, what Sun Zi 
would call ‘knowing the enemy’s capability but not knowing your own 
capability.’ We have little choice but to swallow a little pride [and 




As far as the Japanese were concerned, their incorporation into inter-
national society took place under the threat of military force. Their signing 
of the unequal trading treaties—which limited Japan’s sovereignty and 
were not reciprocal—also took place under the threat of force from US 
consul Harris, who warned the Japanese that British and French naval 
forces could arrive to force Japan to conclude trading treaties.43 It is not 
surprising that we again see highly negative Japanese accounts of 
international society identical to those written prior to 1853, that 
emphasised the use of coercion to attain power. The mid-nineteenth 
century was therefore a period in which Japanese views of international 
society in the early nineteenth century were confirmed. For instance, 
Kuroda commented that warfare was ‘a constant state of affairs in foreign 
41  Satō Seizaburō notes that the rōjū, Abe Masahiro (1819–57) reported that opinions tended to be 
more hardline the further they were from Edo, while those ‘who came to Edo and “understood the 
situation of foreign countries”’ were more realistic and tended to call for some form of 
accommodation with the US’s demands. See Satō Seizaburō, ‘Bakumatsu/Meiji shoki ni okeru taigai 
ishiki no shoruikei’, in Satō Seizaburō and R. Dingman, eds, Kindai nippon no taigai taido (Tokyo: 
Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1974), pp. 1–34, at pp. 16–17. 
42  Kuroda Narihiro, ‘Kuroda Narihiro jōsho’, in Yoshida Tsunekichi and Satō Seizaburō, eds, Nihon 
shisō taikei, Volume 56: Bakumatsu seiji ronshū (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1976), pp. 27–35, at p. 30. 
43  See ‘Rōjū tassho’; ‘Hyōteijo ichiza jōshin sho’; ‘Kaibōgakari no ōmetsuke, metsuke jōshinsho’, in 
Yoshida and Satō, eds, Nihon shisō taikei, Volume 56, pp. 51, 53, 58. See also Wakabayashi, 
‘Opium, expulsion, sovereignty’, pp. 17–18. Citations such as ‘Rōjū tassho’ represent collectives 
rather than individual authors’ memorials.
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countries [i.e. the West]’,44 while Matsudaira Yoshinaga stated that the 
international situation that Japan now found itself in was a place where 
‘fights take place between those who conquer and who are conquered’.45 
Hotta Masayoshi’s memorial to the shogunate in 1857 states that ‘[t]he 
current international situation resembles that of China’s Spring and 
Autumn period and the last years of Ashikaga rule in Japan’ 
(一体当今万国の形勢一変致し､粗漢土春秋列国の時､本邦足利氏の
末年に似たる有様の大なるもの).46 
How was Japan to respond to this new international order? This was an 
obvious question to occupy the minds of the Japanese elite for years to 
come. Drawing on Arnold Toynbee, Minamoto Ryōen states that the 
Japanese political elite showed two different responses.47 The first type was 
what Toynbee called the ‘Zealots’, who clung to their traditional culture and 
showed strong xenophobic reactions towards the newly introduced culture. 
In Japan, this took the form of attacks on foreigners and their property 
(攘夷jōi). Naturally, the consequences of this form of reaction were 
disastrous for Japan. The protection of foreign nationals and their property 
was seen as an imperative component of the ‘standard of civilisation’ at the 
time, and failure to do so would often render the ‘uncivilised’ state beyond 
the pale of the protection of international law and invite more foreign 
intervention. Moreover, the West, fully aware of the potential resentment 
caused by the domineering manner in which they incorporated non-
European states into international society, often believed that a demon-
stration of military might would be a useful way to enforce observance of 
the code of conduct as stipulated in the treaties and ‘standard of 
civilisation’. As the British minister to Japan, Sir Rutherford Alcock argued: 
44  Kuroda, ‘Kuroda Narihiro jōsho’, p. 34. 
45  Cited in Satō, ‘Bakumatsu/Meiji shoki ni okeru taigai ishiki no shoruikei’, p. 15. 
46  Hotta Masayoshi, ‘Hotta Masayoshi ikensho’, in Yoshida and Satō, eds, Nihon shisō taikei, Volume 
56, pp. 67–71, at p. 69. Hotta Masayoshi was the rōjū at the time of the signing of the 1858 trading 
treaty between the US and Japan. The end of Ashikaga rule is known as Japan’s own ‘Warring States 
Period’ (sengoku jidai). During this time, many local warlords vied for the unification of Japan. 
47  Minamoto Ryōen, ‘Bakumatsu, ishiuki ni okeru “Kaikoku zushi” no juyō: Sakuma Shōzan o 
chūshin to shite’, Nihon kenkyū 9, 1993, pp. 13–25, at pp. 20–1. 




It is weakness, or the suspicion of it, which invariably provokes wrong 
and aggression in the East, and is a far more fertile cause of bad faith and 
danger among Asiatics than either force or the abuse of strength. Hence 
it is that all diplomacy in these regions which does not rest on a solid 
substratum of force, or an element of strength, to be laid bare when all 
gentler processes fail, rests on false premises, and must of necessity fail 
in its object.48
Another response, which is labelled the ‘Herodian’ approach, was to 
adopt superior elements of an alien culture/society and use this to ensure the 
survival of the indigenous culture. As jōi movements resulted in frequent 
clashes with the West and subsequent defeats for the more xenophobic 
Japanese, it became increasingly clear that the only chance for Japan to 
ensure its survival was by adopting a more ‘Herodian’ approach. The drive 
to adopt what was considered to be superior elements of the West—military 
hardware was the earliest choice—gathered momentum. Eventually, an 
increasing number of Japanese samurai came to the conclusion that the 
political system had to be overhauled as well. The Tokugawa regime’s 
weakness in face of the ever-present Western threat would mean that Japan 
could never regain its former status as a fully sovereign nation free from the 
yoke of the Western states.49 A new form of political system had to be 
adopted. It was against this background that the Meiji Restoration 
(明治維新Meiji ishin) took place and Japan started taking real steps 
towards fully integrating itself into international society.50  
48  Beasley, Japanese imperialism, 1894–1945, p. 20. 
49  I use this word guardedly and with reservation: sovereignty as a concept did not exist in East Asian 
international relations, as states were arranged, often hypothetically, into hierarchical orders. 
Sovereign equality was not usually the norm. However, ‘sovereignty’ can be said to have existed in 
the sense that states within the tributary system did not interfere with each other’s domestic affairs. 
Owen N. Denny, the US diplomatic advisor to Korea in 1885, noted that ‘the past tribute 
relationships were sustained by a faith unshakable as long as China’s treatment of its tributaries 
remained gentle, cordial, and fair and did not seek to interfere either with another country’s system 
of tributary relationships or with its sovereignty and independence.’ However, Denny himself ‘was 
not sure whether or not Korean state sovereignty existed at all.’ See Hamashita Takeshi, ‘The intra-
regional system in East Asia in modern times’, in Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi, eds, 
Network power: Japan and Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 113–35, at pp. 126–7. I 
am indebted to Miwa Hirono for this point. 
50  The Meiji Restoration was a political movement which aimed at overthrowing the shogunate and 
establishing a new government that could better cope with the expanding Western powers. It is 
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It was during the Meiji phase that Japan’s political elite consolidated 
rather than radically changed their understanding of the use of coercion 
within international society, which was carried over from the Tokugawa 
period. Deep suspicions towards international society persisted, and 
consequently the Japanese political leadership continued to see their inter-
national environment as a highly insecure one.51 A brief survey of 
memorials describing international politics by key political leaders in Japan 
reveals a striking similarity to those of the Tokugawa officials. In a famous 
memorial submitted in 1869, shortly after the Meiji Restoration, Iwakura 
Tomomi52 offered this opinion of the international order at the time: 
… although it can be said that all states overseas maintain contact with 
each other, in the end all states overseas are our country’s enemies 
(海外万国ハ固ヨリ交通セサルヲ得トスト雖、畢竟海外万国ハ我カ
皇国ノ公敵ナリ). What are these enemies? All foreign states nowadays 
study, improve their technology and aim to become rich and strong. 
Even small states like the Netherlands stand proud and independent, 
even though they are surrounded by great powers (海外万国ハ各其 
自国ヲシテ他国ノ上ニ立タシメンコトヲ欲ス) … All foreign states 
wish to stand above other states: state A wants to stand above B, B over 
C. It is for these reasons that I say that foreign states are all our 
enemies.53
Moreover, such views appear to have persisted during the Meiji period. 
In a memorial submitted in 1880, we see Yamagata Aritomo claiming that 
modern states ‘possess their own clearly demarcated territory and are 
responsible for protecting it themselves. If their soldiers are not strong, it is 
known as a ‘Restoration’ because the movement’s leaders (usually provincial samurai) utilised the 
emperor as a rallying point to set up an alternative form of government. 
51  See Peter Duus, The abacus and the sword (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 15–
18; Banno Junji, ‘Meiji shoki (1873–85) no “taigaikan” (Perceptions of international relations in 
early Meiji)’, Kokusai seiji 71, 1982, pp. 10–20; and Satō, ‘Bakumatsu/Meiji shoki ni okeru taigai 
ishiki no shoruikei’, p. 28. 
52  Iwakura Tomomi (1825–83) was one of the key officials of the early Meiji government. He served as 
vice president of the dajōkan government, and was also foreign minister (gaimukyō) for a brief 
period in 1871. From 1871–73 he served as ambassador to Japan’s fact-finding mission to the West. 
53  Iwakura Tomomi, Iwakura kō jikki, Volume 2, ed. Tada Kōmon (Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1968), p. 697. 
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impossible for them to maintain their own independence’.54 In 1887, Inoue 
Kaoru submitted a policy paper in which the international order was 
described as follows: 
Since the 1870s and 1880s, troubles have been settled between the 
European states, and it has become impossible to wantonly resort to 
force. However, these [European states] have recently tended to con-
centrate on political tactics in the colonies … Ah! The continents of Asia 
and Africa have now become a hunting ground for the West.55
Such views may well have been strengthened by the opinions of other 
international leaders. During the Iwakura mission’s visit to Berlin in 1873, 
the famous practitioner of power politics, German Chancellor Otto von 
Bismarck, offered the Japanese delegation his views of international 
politics. The Japanese delegation concluded that Bismarck’s words ‘were 
extremely meaningful, and we should take note of his mastering of 
diplomatic courtesy and political manoeuvring’.56 Bismarck’s remarks on 
international politics appear to have made a deep impression on the 
Japanese delegation, and are worth citing in length: 
… although all states of the world nowadays interact with each other in a 
friendly and courteous manner, this is entirely superficial. Behind the 
scenes, states both strong and weak compete with each other, and have 
little respect for each other. When I was young and Prussia was weak, 
the political leaders cared little for the country. Upon seeing the realities 
of small states I always felt aggrieved, and this has never left my mind. 
As for international law, it is supposed to be a law which protects the 
rights of states. However, once the interests of great powers are 
concerned, the law is used to protect the rights of the great powers, and if 
international law is contrary to the interests of the great powers, military 
might is used instead. Although small states may try to keep to the 
courtesies and rules of diplomacy to protect their independence, once 
54  Yamagata Aritomo, ‘Shin rinpō heibi ryakuhyō’, in Ōyama Azusa, ed., Yamagata Aritomo ikensho 
(Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1966), p. 91. Yamagata Aritomo (1838–1922) was a key member of the Meiji 
oligarchy. In the dajōkan government, he was army minister (1873) and councillor (1874). He 
became prime minister in 1889 and 1898.  
55  Inoue Kaoru kō denki hensan kai, Segai Inoue kō den, Volume 3 (Tokyo: Naigai shoseki, 1934), pp. 
907–8. 
56  Kume Kunitake, Beiō kairan jikki, Volume 3 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1979), p. 330. 
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they face military tactics (by others) it is usually the case that they are 
unable to maintain their independence.57 
The members of this very same mission also had the chance to witness the 
colonised Southeast Asian states for themselves, and they appear to have 
concluded that international society was indeed a perilous one in which 
only the fittest could survive. The delegation’s secretary recorded: ‘The 
flesh of the weak is eaten by the strong. Ever since the Europeans began 
sailing to faraway lands, the weaker states of the tropics have been 
devoured by them [the European powers]’.58
REINVENTING THE JAPANESE VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 
As the above discussion has shown, Japanese leaders’ understanding of 
international society was not one of stability and order, but of insecurity. 
This is not particularly difficult to imagine if one considers the coercive 
conditions under which Japan was incorporated into international society. 
However, conventional English School approaches have failed to fully 
incorporate these factors. Indeed, conventional analyses fail to incorporate 
any Japanese interpretations of the institutions of international society. If 
international society was a perilous world in Japanese eyes, it is difficult 
to imagine that they saw its institutions as serving to reduce uncertainty 
and fear.  
This shortcoming appears to be primarily a product of English School 
scholars’ assumptions that international society plays an important role in 
ameliorating the effects of anarchy, thus creating a less competitive, 
precarious international order.59 However, this was not the case with the 
West vis-à-vis Asian states in the nineteenth century. Europe’s rapid indus-
trial advances and military advantages resulted in a sense of superiority, and 
a tendency to regard non-Europeans as ‘barbarous’ and inferior. As Edward 
Keene’s work has shown, the historical evidence overwhelmingly suggests 
that the normative framework of European international society applied 
57  Ibid., p. 329. 
58  Kume Kunitake, Beiō kairan jikki, Volume 5 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1982), p. 307. 
59  Wight, ‘Western values in international relations’. Also see Jacinta O’Hagan, Conceptualizing the 
West in international relations: From Spengler to Said (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p. 129. 
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primarily to European states only.60 The West’s dealings with many non-
European states were based on highly coercive policies that were often 
contrary to the norms of international society as stipulated by English 
School scholars. It thus seems necessary to acknowledge the fact that non-
European states (and perhaps every individual state to differing degrees) are 
likely to ‘reimagine’ international society and its institutions and shape their 
policies accordingly. Only by focusing greater attention on non-European 
states’ exposure to European international society can we gain a deeper 
understanding of how this ‘reimagining’ takes place and how it affects non-
European states’ interpretation of international society and adoption of its 
institutions.  
In the case of the Japanese political elite’s interpretations, we have seen 
that the leadership at the time tended to see their new international 
environment as a competitive one in which only the militarily strong could 
survive. The Meiji leadership’s response was to place national strengthening 
as one of its top priorities. In the Japanese leadership’s case, survival in this 
competitive world would mean matching the European states’ power. 
Slogans such as ‘rich country, strong army (富国強兵 fukoku kyōhei)’ and 
‘promote industry (殖産興業 shokusan kōgyō)’ are typical reflections of 
this thinking.  
Following from this, we can surmise that the Japanese leadership’s 
interpretations of the institutions of European international society were 
characterised by a relative lack of trust in the obligations of these 
institutions to promote common interests and allow for the coexistence of 
its member states.61 Japanese interpretations had considerable resemblance 
to what Wight calls the ‘realist’ interpretations of international society,62 
60  Keene, Beyond the anarchical society. 
61  This belief, also known as the ‘Grotian’ tradition of international society, is the dominant 
interpretation of international society advocated by English School scholars. 
62  This should not be confused with realist international relations theory, particularly as forwarded by 
scholars such as Kenneth N. Waltz. While Waltz’s version of neorealism is a conscious effort to 
adopt a ‘realist’ perspective within a strictly scientific theoretical framework, Wight’s ‘realist’ 
tradition is a collection of traits of thought. If anything, Wight’s version comes closest to the ‘realist’ 
perspective adopted by Hans J. Morgenthau in his Politics among nations (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1973). 
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which places less faith in the efficacy of international society’s institutions 
and emphasises the utility of raw power politics. This connection between 
the Japanese interpretation of the prevalence of the use of coercion and their 
subsequent interpretation of how international society should be adopted is 
what we shall examine next. 
THE MEIJI JAPANESE LEADERSHIP’S PERCEPTIONS OF INTER-
NATIONAL SOCIETY’S INSTITUTIONS 
The institutions of war, the role of great powers, and the balance of power 
appear to be the most conspicuous aspects of international society as seen 
from the eyes of the Meiji leadership. However, unlike the Grotian inter-
pretation, there is little room for any of these institutions to play a part in 
maintaining the constitutive norm of international society, the preservation 
of states’ sovereign integrity.  
Japanese perceptions of the institution of war requires the least 
explanation. The Grotian interpretation of war believes that ‘[p]eace is the 
norm, and war the violation or exception; peace is logically prior to war’ 
and ‘war is a necessary evil, to be minimized as far as possible. It is 
necessary, because it is the only means of justice when there is no political 
superior’.63 The Western powers themselves did not show a strong interest 
in colonising Japan, and consequently ‘the view of imminent war in which 
Japan’s very survival was at stake’ receded after the Meiji Restoration.64 
However, as the discourse of the Meiji political elite has demonstrated, this 
did not mean that the Meiji leadership ceased to see their international 
environment as an insecure one. Indeed, as Satō Seizaburō states, ‘even 
when the direct threats of war had faded away, “wars” such as “economic 
wars” or “diplomatic wars” were constantly on the minds of [the Japanese]. 
Therefore, the “Warring States” analogy, while taking a different form, 
remained and returned as the framework of analysis for international affairs 
whenever an international crisis broke out’.65
63  Martin Wight, International theory: The three traditions, eds Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter (New 
York: Holmes & Meier, 1992), pp. 206–7. 
64  Satō, ‘Bakumatsu/Meiji shoki ni okeru taigai ishiki no shoruikei’, p. 28. 
65  Ibid. 
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In such a dangerous world, the great powers were most certainly not seen 
as playing the role of maintaining the norms of international society, at least 
within Asia. Within the context of relations with non-European states, the 
moral purpose of European international society was not one of toleration 
and coexistence (under mutual respect for the sovereignty of states), but 
rather ‘the promotion of civilisation’ where the Western powers took it upon 
themselves to ‘encourage economic progress and stamp out the barbarism, 
corruption, despotism and incompetence that they believed to be charac-
teristic of most indigenous regimes’ and intervened in non-European states 
to attain this purpose.66 Consequently, the Meiji Japanese leadership 
continued to look upon the great powers—the very states that had forced the 
unequal treaties upon them—with the utmost suspicion and regarded them 
as the biggest threat to the survival of the Japanese state. Yamagata’s 
statement in 1880 is a typical example: 
Now it is said that that the Western countries do not massacre other 
tribes like ancient barbarians, but merely paralyse a state’s armies and 
use their own soldiers to bring about the capitulation of others. 
Therefore, they will not take over others’ lands … Now how can that be 
true? It is not about the West not doing this or not being able to do this, it 
is merely about them caring about their own gains. Therefore we see 
Poland being split into three and India being swallowed up by Britain. Is 
this not about seizing another state? … The Western states compete with 
each other over their weapons, each vying to overtake another … they 
are like greedy wolves and eye each other like tigers, trying to take 
advantage of the slightest chance presented to them …67
Could the institution of the balance of power protect the Japanese from 
the threat of expanding Western powers? There was no guarantee of that 
either. It was certainly realised that among the Western powers, the balance 
of power appeared to function in such a way to allow weaker states to 
survive. It was acknowledged that within the West the great powers also 
played a crucial role in maintaining this balance of power. The Iwakura 
mission’s records indicate that the members noted that ‘the states of Europe 
all differ in size and strength, and their independence is maintained because 
66  Keene, Beyond the anarchical society, pp. 98–9. 
67  Yamagata, ‘Shin rinpō heibi ryakuhyō’, p. 91. 
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the five great powers maintain a balance of power’.68 The balance of power 
did, as Tōyama Shigeki argues, also prevent outright expansion at the time 
of early Meiji Japan.69 However, this did not stop the great powers from 
stripping Japan of its sovereign prerogatives. In fact, the Western powers 
joined up to force Japan to sign unequal treaties, and, through the most 
favoured nation clause, made sure any economic benefits to be derived from 
trading with Japan would be equally enjoyed by all powers. 
In conventional works by English School scholars, international law and 
diplomacy have usually been subject to much attention, as they provide the 
strongest evidence of non-European states’ adoption of cooperative insti-
tutions which give international politics a degree of order and certainty. 
Therefore, it seems appropriate to examine Japan’s adoption of these two 
institutions and whether or not these institutions were really seen as playing 
a crucial role in reducing the effects of an anarchical world. 
The adoption of the diplomatic system was perhaps the least coercive 
process of adapting to international society for Japan. Primary sources 
indicate that the Meiji leadership itself regarded the diplomatic system as a 
useful institution in which Japan’s interests could be advanced. Terashima 
Munenori,70 who later became foreign minister, wrote in a letter in 1865: 
Although it is said that the weak are the food of the strong, Greece, 
Portugal, Denmark and the Netherlands are weak, and do not pose a 
threat to any state at all. Yet, they held each other at bay and maintain 
their independence, and this is also the reason why Turkey was not 
devoured by Russia … If Japan is to remain independent for ever and 
stand on an equal footing with the countries of the world, it is time for 
the ruler of Japan to open his eyes and rid Japan of old habits. Japan 
68  Kume Kunitake, Beiō kairan jikki, Volume 4 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1980), p. 106. 
69  Tōyama Shigeki, ‘Meiji shonen no gaikō ishiki’, in Ronshū nihon rekishi kankōkai and Haraguchi 
Munehisa, eds, Ronshū nihon rekishi, Volume 9: Meiji ishin (Tokyo: Yūseidō shuppan, 1973), pp. 
131–43, at p. 131. 
70  Terashima Munenori (1833–93) was from the Satsuma fiefdom. He studied rangaku, or Western 
studies, and had experience of travel in Europe. He played an important part in the newly established 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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must be reborn. This means that Japan must send ambassadors to several 
great powers overseas.71
However, Japan’s seemingly eager participation in the diplomatic system 
should not be taken as a sign of commitment to the Grotian ideal of 
diplomacy in international society, which sees diplomacy as ‘the ability to 
deal on even terms, the possibility of give and take, where either side can 
make concessions while leaving the substance of its interests intact’.72 
Although the diplomatic system itself is not seen as particularly coercive 
and indeed useful, Western diplomacy is seen somewhat differently. 
Diplomacy is seen as an arena in which ‘exchanges of favours, threats, 
and secret treaties of war’ are played out.73 Without ‘extreme bravery and 
deep knowledge of European diplomacy’, Japanese diplomats ‘could fall 
under the tricks of European diplomats and leave unspeakable national 
difficulties in the future’.74  
This dual view of the cooperative elements of international society 
persists in Japanese views of international law. In the minds of the Japanese 
leadership, one of the most important institutions in international society 
was international law. Indeed, one of the first announcements of Meiji 
Japan’s desire to participate in international society was couched in terms of 
participation in ‘the [international] order of “the law of nations”’.75 
Accordingly, the five national goals announced by the Emperor Meiji 
(Gokajō no seimon) in 1868 stated that ‘Old habits shall be discarded and 
[the new government’s national policies] will be based on the way of 
heaven and earth’.76 However, despite this agreement over the importance 
of international law, there appears to have been some division over the 
71  Inuzuka Takaaki, ‘Meiji shoki gaikō shidōsha no taigai ninshiki: Soejima Taneomi to Terashima 
Munenori o chūshin ni’, Kokusai seiji 102, 1993, pp. 22–38, at p. 24. 
72  Wight, International theory, p. 181. 
73  Itō Hirobumi, ed., Hishoruisan: Gaikō hen, Volume 1 (Tokyo: Hishoruisan kankōkai, 1936), p. 167. 
74  Ibid. 
75  Takao Sakamoto, ‘“Bankoku kōhō” to “bunmei sekai”’, Gaikō fōramu 100, 1996, pp. 76–84, at 
p. 82; Hosono Kōji, ‘“Bankoku kōhō” ninshiki kara tōyō meishuron made: Ono Azusa no taigairon 
to sono tenkai’, Waseda daigakushi kiyō 12(16) 1979, pp. 81–111, at pp. 84–5. 
76  Rekishigaku kenkyūkai, ed., Nihonshi shiryō, Volume 4: Kindai (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1997), 
p. 82. 
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interpretations of international law among the Meiji elite. Hirosawa 
Saneomi,77 who became councillor in the dajōkan government acknow-
ledged the role international law plays in protecting the sovereignty of 
states, stating that ‘small states rely on this [international law] for their 
preservation, compelling the larger states to refrain from using threats and 
force.’78 Similarly, Sanjō Sanetomi acknowledged the function international 
law is supposed to serve in his memorial to Iwakura in 1871: 
The existence of international law (rekkoku kōhō) is to enable states, 
with equal rights and free from the threats of aggression, to profit from 
trade and engage in diplomacy on equal terms. As states possess equal 
rights, it goes without saying that the treaties they sign are on equal 
terms. International law exists to preserve states’ independence, the 
balance of power and the benefits of diplomacy and allow states to enjoy 
the benefits of trade. It controls imbalances of power … and assists the 
norms of heaven and humanity.79
To a certain extent, the acceptance of international law in Japan is a result 
of Chinese influences in Japan’s learning of international law. One of 
Japan’s earliest introductions to international law was via the Chinese 
translation of Henry Wheaton’s Elements of international law, titled 
Wanguo gongfa (万国公法 Bankoku kōhō in Japanese). The Chinese 
translation itself uses Chinese terms of philosophy and ethics such as 
tianfa, the ‘heavenly laws’ to explain legal obligations, and places 
emphasis on natural law.80 As a result, early Japanese views tended to 
view international law as a form of natural law similar to Confucian ethics 
that was applicable to all nations, and facilitated their acceptance of it.81 
However, this view of international law does not seem to have gained 
77  Hirosawa Saneomi (1833–71) was a samurai from the Chōshū fiefdom. 
78  Cited in Yasuoka Akio, ‘Bankoku kōhō to Meiji gaikō (International law and Meiji diplomacy)’, 
Seiji keizai shigaku 200, January, February and March 1983, pp. 188–99, at p. 194. 
79  Iwakura, Iwakura kō jikki, Volume 2, p. 927. 
80  Sumiyoshi Yoshihito, ‘Meiji shoki ni okeru kokusaihō no dōnyū’, Kokusaihō gaikō zasshi 71(5–6) 
1972, pp. 32–53, at pp. 34–5, 56. 
81  Tanaka Tadashi, ‘Waga kuni ni okeru sensōhō no juyō to jissen: Bakumatsu, meijiki o chūshin ni’, in 
Ōnuma Yasuaki, ed., Kokusaihō, kokusai rengō to Nippon (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1987), pp. 385–426, at 
p. 396. 
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much support among the Meiji leadership. Iwakura, for his part, claimed 
in a memorial in 1875: 
They say that international law is there to protect peaceful relations 
between states and preserve peace. The logic of international law is said 
to be precise, its ethics [‘way’] wide-ranging and fair. If so, even if a 
state is poor, its soldiers weak and its polity not formed it has nothing to 
fear. However, this is certainly not the case. It is also claimed that there 
is nothing better than self-protection [to preserve peace] (jishu jigo). 
Large states stand on equal terms with each other and maintain the 
balance of power for this, but they do not take part in international law.82
In his diary, Kido Takayoshi also confessed his mistrust of international 
law, stating: 
I am forced to believe that the military power of the Empire [Japan] must 
be great enough to deal with the great powers of the West as potential 
enemies. One cannot depend on international law without having a well-
prepared military force. Many countries use the cloak of international 
law to seek their own interest in dealing with weaker nations. This is one 
of the reasons that I call international law a mere tool for depriving a 
weak nation of its rights.83
Such negative views of international law were naturally a result of the 
coercive nature in which Japan was incorporated into international society. 
Despite the fact that states were supposed to be guaranteed their 
sovereignty, the Japanese found their sovereignty limited by the Treaty 
Port system. The realities of international law as stipulated in Western 
works seemed to have little resemblance to Japan’s reality. Moreover, the 
fact that Chinese translations of international war tended to emphasise the 
role of natural law in international law only served to highlight the 
disparities between the ideals (‘heaven’) and realities (‘humanity’) of an 
international order supposedly regulated by international law, and reduced 
its legitimacy as a norm for emulation.84 Consequently, the Japanese 
leadership soon developed their own dual interpretation of international 
82  Iwakura Tomomi, Iwakura kō jikki, Volume 3, ed. Tada Kōmon (Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1968), p. 233. 
83  Kido Takayoshi, The diary of Kido Takayoshi, Volume 1 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1983), 
p. 148. 
84  Tanaka, ‘Waga kuni ni okeru sensōhō no juyō to jissen’, p. 396. 
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law. In this ‘dual’ interpretation, it was acknowledged that those who were 
deemed to have more Westernised or ‘civilised’ political systems were 
more likely to be afforded the protection of international law. This was of 
course the result of the emergence of the ‘standard of civilisation’, which 
had emerged by the time Japan was incorporated into international society 
and had the effect of placing those states labelled as uncivilised beyond 
the pale of the protection of international law as afforded to European 
states. Therefore, apart from undertaking concerted efforts in modernising 
in accordance with the ‘standard of civilisation’,85 the Japanese began to 
utilise international law to protect Japanese interests from the West. 
During a dispute with the British Minister to Japan, Sir Harry Parkes, over 
the Meiji government’s punishment of Christians, Ōkuma Shigenobu 
invoked the laws of domestic sovereignty claiming that ‘foreign countries 
had no right to interfere with Japan punishing its own people in 
accordance with its own laws’.86 
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AND THE RISE OF JAPANESE 
IMPERIALISM 
The way in which Japan interpreted European international society had 
consequences that undermined its very purpose. The result was a rise in 
power politics and imperialism. This interpretation was deeply intertwined 
with Japan’s socialisation into international society. It is of course possible 
to argue that Japanese militarisation and imperialism was simply a result 
of the pressures brought upon them by the Western powers’ encroach-
ment; that Japan learnt that within an anarchical system it must adapt to 
Western practices or suffer like China. We can even find this argument in 
the English School. For example, Watson notes that non-European elites 
embraced Western forms of domestic governance wholeheartedly, 
primarily as ‘[t]he mastery of Western governmental practice and military 
technology enabled these élites to run a modern state’.87 We could expect 
85  Iwakura, Iwakura kō jikki, Volume 2, p. 929. 
86  Ōkuma and Enjōji, Ōkuma haku sekijitsu tan, Volume 1, p. 285. Ōkuma Shigenobu (1838–1922) 
was a middle-ranking samurai from the Hizen fiefdom. He held cabinet posts in finance and foreign 
affairs. He was prime minister in 1898 and 1914–16. He also founded a political party, the Rikken 
kaishintō and Waseda University. 
87  Adam Watson, ‘European international society and its expansion’, in Bull and Watson, eds, The 
expansion of international society, pp. 13–32, at p. 31. 
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much the same from Kenneth N. Waltz’s understanding of how states are 
socialised within an anarchical international system. But the problem here 
is that the Japanese state did not simply aim to become a functional ‘lean, 
mean competitor’,88 but sought to reconfigure its own identity and create 
a domestic socialisation in which Japanese civilisation was on par, or 
surpassed, European powers. In Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett’s 
words, entry into the society of states is 
… also a matter of being recognized as a member of the society of states. 
In any society the identity of the self is in important part constituted by 
the expectations of others, and as such state formation is also a process 
of identity formation.89
In the case of Japan, we see the elites undertake a complete overhaul of 
their state’s domestic political structures and identity to be comparable 
(not competitive) with Western models. Such deep socialisation is not 
recognised by functionalist accounts, which emphasise the learning of 
realpolitik behaviour.90  
This then begs a question: if Japan was indeed engaged in a process of 
socialisation into international society, why was its behavioural outcome so 
different from that as conceptualised by previous English School scholars? 
The answer lies in the dual nature of international society in the nineteenth 
century. This was a time when different sets of rules applied to the 
‘civilised’ states and ‘barbarous’ states. As the Japanese elite noticed 
themselves, those states that were deemed civilised had attained full 
membership of the society of states were indeed often accorded the 
protection of the norms and institutions of international society, which 
88  Martha Finnemore, ‘Norms, culture, and world politics: Insights from sociology’s institutionalism’, 
International Organization 50(2) 1996, pp. 325–47, at p. 332. 
89  Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett, ‘Dependent state formation and Third World militarization’, 
Review of International Studies 19(4) 1993, pp. 321–47, at p. 336, emphasis in original. Wendt and 
Barnett’s term ‘state formation’ may be somewhat inapplicable in the Japanese case, as Japan had 
already successfully asserted central control over its territory at some point in its history. Moreover, 
this term gives a somewhat Eurocentric impression in that it seems to imply that any non-European 
state that failed to follow the historical process of state formation (in itself a term derived from a 
study of European history) cannot be considered to have been a viable ‘state’. 
90  Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of international politics (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 127–8. 
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aimed for some form of coexistence among states. However, the situation 
for ‘civilised’ states with regard to their behaviour vis-à-vis the ‘non-
civilised’ states was different. At a time when imperialism was frequently 
seen as a mission of civilising those deemed as barbarous, imperialism and 
a strong military to support this was also regarded as an integral part of a 
‘civilised’ state’s identity.91 Rather than respecting their ‘sovereignty’, the 
Western powers frequently invoked (or ignored) international law to invade 
and colonise many Asian and African states. They respected the balance of 
power with each other, and this even extended to their imperialistic 
expansions, where each state carved up a ‘sphere of influence’ for itself. 
Japan’s socialisation into international society did not necessarily entail a 
deep commitment to preserving the sovereign independence of other states, 
particularly weaker ones. Instead, the Japanese elites decided that Japan 
should become a strong, imperialist power like the European powers, and 
encouraged the transformation of Japanese society, as well as the 
socialisation of other peoples in East Asia, along these lines. The Japanese 
elite concluded that to become a full, ‘civilised’ member of international 
society, in addition to meticulously observing the ‘standard of civilisation’, 
they would have to construct a strong, imperialistic state: after all, the great 
‘civilised’ powers were at the same time the most militarily powerful and 
possessed vast colonies.  
This viewpoint is visible in Inoue’s memorial. After giving an overview 
of an increasingly precarious East Asia, Inoue claims that the only way for 
Japan to survive this is ‘to transform our empire and its people into a state 
and people like Europe. I emphasise that the only way [for Japan to ensure 
its independence] is to create a new, European-styled empire in the 
Orient’.92 Being a powerful imperialist power would not only militarily 
protect Japan, it would also help Japan be recognised as a full member of 
the ‘civilised’ society of states and be accorded its protection. This view 
does not necessarily appear to have been one unique to Japan. It is no 
91  Akira Iriye, ‘Japan’s drive to great-power status’, in Marius B. Jansen, ed., The emergence of Meiji 
Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 268–329, at p. 312. See also William H. 
McNeill, The pursuit of power: Technology, armed force, and society since AD 1000 (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1982), p. 256. 
92  Inoue, Segai Inoue kō den, Volume 3, p. 913. 
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accident that Japan’s revision of the unequal treaties, which symbolised 
Japan’s entry as a full member into European international society, came 
about in 1911, after Japan had defeated both China and Russia (the latter 
being a European imperial power) and attained colonies for itself.  
Accordingly, Japan’s military expenditure soared. Japan also moved 
towards attaining ‘civilised’ identity by sending out military expeditions to 
its Asian neighbours, which would greatly assist in ‘civilising’ these states. 
In striking similarity to the Western powers’ behaviour vis-à-vis non-
Western states, it was claimed that imperialism had a civilising element to it. 
In the case of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, it was claimed that  
Japan, as the most modernized nation in Asia, had the obligation … to 
come to the aid of its weaker neighbor [Korea] and to punish the Chinese 
who had not awakened to the importance of cooperating with the 
Japanese to spread civilization in Asia.93
This decision was deeply intertwined with the goal of becoming a full 
member of international society. It was made more acute by a deep sense of 
anxiety on the part of the Japanese that the Western powers were constantly 
seeking to gain some form of concessions at the expense of Japan.94 The 
Japanese had observed that those who were accorded full membership of 
the society of states were more likely to be accorded the respect and 
protection of the norms of international society which applied to ‘civilised’ 
states only. Moreover, the ‘civilised’ member states of this society appeared 
to have been given the prerogative to manipulate the ostensibly cooperative 
institutions (particularly international law) of international society to 
advance their own interests.  
The oft-cited cooperative institutions which indicate Japan’s incor-
poration into international society, international law and diplomacy, often 
became a useful tool with which to justify Japan’s aggression, and in many 
cases the great powers did little to stop Japan. In many ways, this was a 
perfectly plausible interpretation of international law. The territory of 
‘Backward Peoples’ who possessed ‘a tribal organization whose community 
93  Iriye, ‘Japan’s drive to great-power status’, p. 312. 
94  See Peattie, ‘Introduction’, p. 8. 
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is not to be considered as a State’ could be legally occupied by the 
‘civilised’ powers.95 In this sense, the ‘standard of civilisation’ was more 
than just a ‘response to the practical problem of protecting European life, 
liberty and property in sometimes hostile non-European countries’ or a 
‘response to the philosophical problem of determining which countries 
deserved legal recognition and legal personality in international law’ which 
‘provided a doctrinal rationale for limiting recognition in international law 
to candidate countries’ as argued by Gong.96 It provided the legal basis for 
colonisation and, for Japan, the signing of the unequal treaties.  
However, at the same time, the Japanese leadership was perceptive 
enough to realise the duality of international society and that international 
law could be applied in international relations, provided the states in 
question were accorded ‘civilised’ status. Consequently, the Japanese 
leadership developed a dual use for international law. International law was 
used to demonstrate Japan’s civilisation and place Japan on an equal footing 
with the Western powers. Equality with the West would give Japan a better 
chance of joining the ‘civilised nations’ and placing it under the protection 
of international law, and the Japanese made sure that Japan’s adoption of 
‘civilised’ norms were propagated. In an article written in 1898, shortly after 
the Sino-Japanese War, Sakue Takahashi elucidated Japan’s ‘civilised’ 
wartime behaviour by juxtaposing it with an ‘uncivilised’ China that had not 
even entered international conventions. Takahashi stated: 
At the very beginning of the war the Japanese Government thought it 
would be the most convenient and civilized course to make some 
communication with China regarding the exemption of private property 
on sea. China was not a signatory of the Declaration of Paris, and, 
moreover, she had never made any effort to enter into any convention of 
such a kind; but it was the purpose of Japan, notwithstanding the nature 
of her opponent, to give an example of generosity by carrying on 
hostilities in an enlightened and lawful fashion.97
95  M. F. Lindley, The acquisition and government of backward territory in international law: Being a 
treatise on the law and practice relating to colonial expansion (New York: Negro Universities Press, 
1969), p. 18. 
96  See Gong, The standard of ‘civilization’ in international society, p. 117. 
97  Sakue Takahashi, The application of international law during the Chino-Japanese war (London: 
Stevens and Sons, 1898), p. 2. 
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Towards its weaker neighbours, Japan fully utilised international law to 
justify any aggression. It claimed the right to send an expeditionary force 
to Taiwan by arguing that the island was not effectively ruled by China, 
even though the latter claimed territorial possession. This, of course, was 
exactly the same logic used by the West to interfere or colonise those 
‘uncivilised’ states.  
SOME PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
Several points emerge from this article on the study of the expansion of 
international society. First, it would be disingenuous to presume that non-
European states would commit themselves to the norms of international 
society in such a short period of time. This is perhaps a result of legal 
positivism adopted by scholars such as Wight or Bull, who believe that 
entry into international society implies an almost automatic and reciprocal 
commitment to the institutions and practices of international society.98 
While it is probably correct that even improvised rules, ‘if and when they 
are observed for long enough, come to be reflected in common “modes of 
thought, patterns of behaviour and preferred norms and values”’,99 this can 
take longer than generally assumed by English School scholars. 
Moreover, they can even be re-interpreted, quite often because of the very 
way in which these states were incorporated into international society. 
Many non-European states’ outlook on international politics and the 
reconfigurations of their domestic structures were likely to have reflected 
the different norms which governed their relations with European powers, 
as well as their own interpretations, rather than simply reflecting ‘the 
dominant European standard of “civilization”’.100 Nowadays, with 
increasing interdependence and globalisation taking place, it is easy to 
claim that the norms and institutions of international society have gained 
worldwide acceptance. At an age when conflicts are increasingly taking 
place in areas outside the industrialised states rather than within, it may be 
 98  A. Claire Cutler, ‘The “Grotian tradition” in international relations’, Review of International Studies  
17(1) 1991, pp. 41–65, at pp. 49–58. 
 99  Hedley Bull, ‘The European international order’, in Alderson and Hurrell, eds, Hedley Bull on 
international society, pp. 170–87, at p. 184. 
100 Gong, ‘China’s entry into international society’, p. 172. 
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of some use for us to explore such states’ failure to adopt the cooperative 
norms and institutions of international society. It may be necessary for 
critical reflection of whether or not the great powers, who supposedly 
have an ethical responsibility in ensuring that the norms of international 
society are observed, are partly to blame for this. 
Second, and most importantly, it is necessary to fully acknowledge that 
international society does not have a single, cooperative feature as has been 
previously portrayed. International society in the nineteenth century was 
two-faced—it had different sets of norms and institutions, and shaped 
the West’s behaviour between themselves and non-Western peoples 
accordingly. To be fair to English School scholars, this point has been 
suggested to a certain extent. Wight stated that there ‘is an outer circle that 
embraces all mankind, under natural law, and an inner circle, the corpus 
Christianorum bound by the laws of Christ. The inner circle is unique’.101 
Bull, for his part, argues that it was almost inevitable that international 
society was dualistic, as ‘it could hardly have been expected that European 
states could have extended the full benefits of membership of the society of 
states to political entities that were in no position to enter into relationships 
on a basis of reciprocity’.102 However, the main focus of the study of inter-
national society has been on the relations between its constitutive members, 
where there exist ‘common interests, practices, rules and institutions’.103 
Scholars working within the international society tradition have not ade-
quately conceptualised the constitutive norms and institutions of inter-
national society as applied to non-members and the actions and outlooks of 
constituent members towards these states.104 This one-sided debate renders 
the English School approach unable to explain why the Japanese framed 
their national interests and goals in militaristic/imperialistic terms, rather 
101 Martin Wight, Systems of states (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), p. 128. 
102 Bull, ‘The emergence of a universal international society’, p. 122. 
103 See Cutler, ‘The “Grotian tradition” in international relations’, p. 59. 
104 Some exceptions to this include Keene’s Beyond the anarchical society; Martin Wight, ‘Theory of 
mankind: Barbarism’, in Wight International theory, pp. 49–98; Timothy Dunne, ‘Colonial 
encounters in international relations: Reading Wight, writing Australia’, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 51(3) 1997, pp. 309–23; and Paul Keal, ‘“Just backward children”: 
International law and the conquest of non-European peoples’, Australian Journal of International 
Affairs 49(2) 1995, pp. 191–206. 
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than cooperative terms. Neither can the English School demonstrate why 
the Janus-faced nature of Western international society was reproduced by 
the Japanese, who defined membership of the society of states in terms of 
imperialist behaviour and used its institutions accordingly to attain this goal. 
Japan’s duplicitous use of international law, on the one hand, to protect itself 
from Western encroachment, while on the other utilising the very same law 
to gain territories at the expense of other Asian states which it now also 
labelled as ‘uncivilised’, mirrored that of the Western powers’ behaviour in 
East Asia and is a case in point.  
However, this does not mean that I render the English School approach 
as useless: as stated in the introduction, my intention is not to destroy the 
English School, but better it by subjecting it to a tough case. The English 
School has seen something of a revival in recent years, with many scholars 
pointing to new, exciting research agendas which could be undertaken by 
this approach.105 Of these I suggest that most exciting, and rewarding, is for 
the English School to seriously engage with its dualistic past—as a force of 
imperialist conquest and as a force of cooperation. As the case study of 
Japan has highlighted, this aspect of international society gave rise to very 
different patterns of socialisation. If the English School is to take its 
interpretive agenda seriously, it needs to explore how this neglected 
‘international society’ which governed relations between ‘civilised’ and 
‘uncivilised’ states affected new members’ socialisation into this society of 
states.  
An additional reason for suggesting this new agenda of research is also a 
normative one. It has been frequently argued that the English School has 
been deeply concerned with upholding some form of morality in the life of 
humankind. As these words are being written, the great power(s) are in the 
process of attempting to socialise rogue states back into the society of states. 
If we are to avoid the re-emergence of an international pariah Japan turned 
itself into in the 1930s and 1940s, it is imperative that we ‘socialise’ these 
states into a more just, cooperative international society. A deeper 
examination and understanding of the darker past of the society of states is 
surely a good starting point. 
105 Barry Buzan, ‘The English School: An underexploited resource in IR’, Review of International 
Studies 27(3) 2001, pp. 471–88. 
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